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BOOK REVIEWS
Augustine, by Gareth B. Matt hews. Oxford: Blackwell, 2005. Pp. 148. $19.95 
(paper). 
SUSAN BROWER-TOLAND, Saint Louis University 
Matt hews’s new book, Augustine, is the second volume to appear in 
Blackwell’s new Great Minds series. The series itself is designed to pro-
vide readers with “a strong sense of the fundamental views of the great 
western philosophers and . . . the relevance of these philosophers to the 
way we live and think today” (from the title page). Given the aims of the 
series one might expect Matt hews’s book to be synoptic in nature, pro-
viding an exposition of Augustine’s major philosophical works, say, or 
perhaps oﬀ ering a broad overview of his central philosophical doctrines 
and achievements. What Matt hews delivers, however, is something rather 
diﬀ erent—something that by all means does achieve the stated aims of the 
series but, nevertheless, does so in unexpected ways. This is because, in in-
troducing us to Augustine, Matt hews does not adopt the usual “view from 
above” angle, but rather he approaches the material from the perspective 
of “events on the ground”—Augustine in the philosophical trenches. As a 
result, this book is best thought of not as a broad or systematic introduc-
tion to Augustine’s philosophy, but rather as something more like a topical 
and thematic introduction to Augustine as philosopher.
The book is divided into 15 chapters, each of which is brief (typical-
ly between 9 and 11 pages), largely self-contained, and fairly narrowly 
focused on a single philosophical puzzle and (in most cases) on just a 
few select texts. One of the benefi ts of this approach is that each chapter 
includes fairly extensive quotations from and commentary on the texts 
in question. Thus, rather than summarizing Augustine’s arguments and 
ideas on a given topic as most introductory texts do, Matt hews proceeds 
by presenting and working through the texts themselves. Insofar as one 
of the most distinctive features of Augustine’s philosophy is the style in 
which it is writt en, there seems no bett er way to introduce Augustine’s 
philosophical ideas and arguments than to allow readers to consider for 
themselves the texts containing them. It should be emphasized, however, 
that the book is not primarily exegetical in nature. Rather, the bulk of each 
chapter consists in Matt hews’s critical, philosophical engagement with the 
arguments and ideas he draws from the texts. In what follows, I oﬀ er a 
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brief summary of the chapters’ contents, hoping to give a sense of the rich-
ness of this approach. 
The book’s 15 chapters can be usefully thought of as dividing into three 
parts: the fi rst (chaps. 1–2) provides a brief introduction to Augustine’s life 
and thought; the second (chaps. 3–9) considers Augustine’s treatment of 
various topics in metaphysics and epistemology (broadly construed); the 
third (chaps. 10–15) focuses on an assortment of issues in philosophy of 
religion and ethics. 
In chapter 1, Matt hews begins by introducing Augustine as “the fi rst 
thinker in Western philosophy . . . to do philosophy from a genuinely fi rst-
person point of view” (p. 3). According to Matt hews, it is Augustine—not 
Descartes—who must be credited with being the fi rst to appreciate the phil-
osophical value of working from such a perspective. It is this feature of Au-
gustine’s philosophy that structures the second part of the book. Each of the 
seven chapters comprising the second part are designed to “bring out philo-
sophically interesting lines of reasoning in Augustine . . . informed by a fi rst-
person point of view in philosophy.” (p. 4) Thus, aft er providing (in chap. 
2) a brief overview of Augustine’s life and intellectual infl uences, Matt hews 
turns (in chaps. 3–9) to trace Augustine’s fi rst-person approach through a 
variety of topics in language, epistemology, mind, and metaphysics. 
The fi rst two chapters in this second part of the book focus on ques-
tions in epistemology and philosophy of language, respectively. In chapter 
3, Matt hews examines Augustine’s response to skepticism. This chapter, 
which focuses solely on Augustine’s early work, Against the Academicians, 
calls special att ention to the role of “inner knowledge”—that is, truths re-
garding our phenomenal experience—in Augustine’s defense against global 
skepticism. According to Matt hews, Augustine’s early att ention to the phe-
nomenal world introduces and prefi gures his focus in subsequent writings 
on “the mind and what it can know about itself.” (p. 21) When, in chapter 
4, Matt hews turns his att ention to Augustine’s discussion of language, he 
focuses mainly on Augustine’s account of language acquisition. Here, Mat-
thews highlights two features of Augustine’s account: its emphasis on the 
point of view of the speaker (and language learner) and the way in which 
critics, such as Witt genstein, have habitually misconstrued the role Augus-
tine assigns to ostension in the overall process of language acquisition. 
The next three chapters (chaps. 5–7) take up various issues in Augus-
tine’s philosophy of mind: the “Augustinian cogito,” his arguments for 
Dualism, and his solution to the Problem of Other Minds. In chapter 
5, Matt hews presents Augustine’s version of the cogito, comparing and 
contrasting it with its Cartesian counterpart. In chapter 6, he provides a 
detailed reconstruction and evaluation of Augustine’s various att empts 
to argue from claims about what the mind knows of itself to the conclu-
sion that the mind is immaterial. Finally, in chapter 7, Matt hews examines 
Augustine’s treatment of the Problem of Other Minds, arguing along the 
way that Augustine is the fi rst Western philosopher not only to explicitly 
state the problem but also to att empt a solution. 
Chapters 8 and 9, the fi nal chapters in the second part of the book, 
address two additional topics in Augustine’s philosophy—both of which 
further refl ect his att ention to the fi rst-person point of view. Chapter 8 
traces Augustine’s treatment of three diﬀ erent “philosophical dream prob-
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lems”: Epistemological (how do I know I’m not dreaming right now?), Meta-
physical (how do I know whether all of life isn’t just my dream?), and Moral 
(am I immoral if I do something immoral in a dream?). The chapter focuses 
mainly on the third of the three—the one that vexed Augustine the most 
and to which he found no easy solution. Chapter 9 deals with Augustine’s 
account of the nature and creation of time. Here Matt hews calls particular 
att ention to Augustine’s development of a subjective, fi rst-person account 
of time. According to Augustine, time is—at least in part—“the measure 
of something mental,” and, hence, is something that “you and I have in 
our minds, simply by virtue of being conscious” (p. 84). 
 In the third and fi nal part of the book Matt hews turns from his thematic 
focus on the fi rst personal aspects of Augustine’s philosophy to examine 
some of Augustine’s most distinctive contributions to discussions in both 
philosophy of religion (chaps. 10–12) and in ethics (pp. 13–15). In chapter 
10, Matt hews explores Augustine’s account of the relationship between 
faith and reason—att empting, in particular, to make sense of the famous 
Augustinian slogan: “faith seeking understanding”. In the following two 
chapters, he traces Augustine’s att empt to work through two important 
problems in philosophical theology: the problem of foreknowledge and 
freedom (chap. 11), and the problem of evil (chap. 12). In each of the two 
chapters, Matt hews surveys a variety of diﬀ erent solutions he fi nds in Au-
gustine. Thus, in connection with the problem of foreknowledge and free-
dom, Matt hews identifi es no less than four diﬀ erent solutions, all of which 
occur in Augustine’s brief discussion in the opening chapters of Book III of 
On Free Choice of the Will. Again, in chapter 12, Matt hews traces three dif-
ferent solutions Augustine oﬀ ers in response to the problem of evil: a Free 
Will Defense, and two others (which he labels “The Imperfection Solution” 
and the “Necessary Contrast Solution”, respectively). 
The last three chapters of the book deal with topics in ethics and moral 
psychology. Chapter 13 is a careful study of Augustine’s famous account 
of the theft  of the pears in Confessions 2—an account which, according to 
Matt hews, embodies a wholesale rejection of the traditional idea that an 
agent desires (and pursues in action) only what she believes to be good. 
The next chapter, which focuses on Augustine’s treatise On Lying, traces 
Augustine’s various and, ultimately, unsuccessful att empts to identify 
necessary and jointly suﬃ  cient conditions for telling a lie. Matt hews takes 
Augustine’s treatment of this issue—and, in particular, his inability to re-
solve the issue to his own satisfaction—as testimony to Augustine’s sensi-
tivity to philosophical perplexity as well as to his philosophical integrity. 
Finally, in the last chapter, Matt hews presents what he takes to be two 
very diﬀ erent conceptions of happiness present in Augustine’s writings: 
an “experiential” conception and a “formal” conception. Matt hews goes 
on to argue that Augustine’s att empt to develop the formal conception is 
much more successful than his eﬀ ort to provide an experiential concept, 
but concludes the chapter and the book by pointing out that it is “entirely 
fi tt ing that the fi rst important philosopher in the Western tradition to try 
to do philosophy from a fi rst person point of view should have made the 
eﬀ ort to say what it is like to be happy” (p. 145).
What the foregoing conveys, I hope, is something of the range and in-
terest of the topics Matt hews pursues in this book. This book is not only 
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philosophically engaging—even for the specialist or scholar—but also 
highly readable, writt en in a way that makes it accessible even to the be-
ginning student of philosophy. As commentator, moreover, Matt hews has 
a unique ability to both identify and draw out precisely those features 
of Augustine’s views which are (alternately) most puzzling, surprising, 
distinctive, or remarkable. He has a way not only of bringing Augustine’s 
philosophical ideas to life but also of calling att ention to their philosophi-
cal interest and relevance to contemporary concerns and discussions. In-
deed, one of the assets of the book is the way Matt hews brings Augus-
tine’s philosophical ideas into dialogue with more recent philosophical 
literature. Matt hews draws fruitful comparisons (and contrasts) between 
Augustine’s and Descartes’s views in philosophy of mind, he subjects Au-
gustine’s account of language acquisition and his treatment of the Prob-
lem of Other Minds to a number of Witt gensteinian critiques, he draws on 
McTaggart’s distinction between A-series and B-series terms in order to 
make sense of diﬀ erent strands in Augustine’s account of time, and puz-
zles over whether Augustine might be presupposing the KK principle in 
his account of self-knowledge—and these are but a few examples.
To be sure, there are inevitable costs associated with the kind of ap-
proach Matt hews pursues in the book. If you want an introduction that 
is both broad in scope and fairly systematic in coverage—a “big picture” 
framing of Augustine’s central doctrines and texts—then Matt hews’s book 
will likely disappoint. The book is, as I’ve indicated, topically organized 
and the choice in topics is not motivated—at least not principally—by a 
desire to provide exhaustive or systematic coverage of even those issues 
for which Augustine is best known. Thus, a number of more prominent 
elements in Augustine’s philosophy (his theory of illumination, his ac-
count of free will, his Platonism in metaphysics, to take a few examples) 
go unmentioned or fi gure only very minimally in Matt hews’s discussion, 
whereas some less central, or in any case lesser-known, topics are given 
considerable att ention (e.g., philosophical dream problems or puzzles 
about willing bad things). Not only this, but Matt hews rarely att empts to 
situate the particular topics he does consider vis-à-vis Augustine’s broader 
views in the same area (say, Augustine’s response to skepticism vis-à-vis 
his broader views in epistemology, Augustine’s account of lying vis-à-vis 
his account of virtues/vices generally, Augustine’s account of wanting bad 
things vis-à-vis his broader views about the nature of the will). Of course, 
none of this owes to any particular failing or oversight on Matt hews’s part; 
it’s simply to say that this book is not that kind of introduction.
Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption and Vir-
tue, by Jeanine Grenberg. Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. xi + 269. 
Cloth $75.
PHILIP J. ROSSI, SJ, Marquett e University
Jeanine Grenberg’s carefully craft ed case in defense of humility as a central 
human virtue starts (Chapter 1) with an account of Kantian rational agency 
